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Managing Legitimacy in Complex and Heterogeneous Environments:  
Sustainable Development in a Globalized World 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The sustainability problems with regard to the production, distribution, and consumption of 
goods and services increasingly challenge the legitimacy of corporations. The literature dis-
tinguishes three strategies that corporations commonly employ to respond to legitimacy prob-
lems: adapt to external expectations, manipulate the perception of their stakeholders or engage 
in a discourse with those who question their legitimacy. We discuss three approaches to de-
termine the appropriate response strategy: one-best-way approach, contingency approach, and 
paradox approach. We suggest that in the face of heterogeneous environments with conflict-
ing demands, corporations follow a paradox approach employing these response strategies 
simultaneously despite their inherent contradictions. We develop a theoretical framework for 
the application of different response strategies and explore the management of paradoxes by 
way of structural, contextual or reflective means. 
 
Key Words: Corporate Legitimacy, Corporate Responsibility, Globalization, Institutional 
Theory, Paradox, Sustainability 
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1 Introduction: Sustainable Development and Corporate Legitimacy 
The United Nations World Commission on Economic Development (WCED) defines sustain-
able development (SD) as the ‘development that meets the needs of the present without com-
promising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ and suggests that this 
‘should become a central guiding principle of the United Nations, Governments and private 
institutions, organizations and enterprises’ (United Nations, 1987). SD rests on three princi-
ples: environmental integrity, social equity, and economic prosperity (Bansal, 2005; Marcus 
and Fremeth, 2009). In its recent analysis of the current state of the planet, the WWF (2012) 
has shown that human development is unsustainable. The globalization process intensifies 
problems such as global warming, chemical pollution, ocean acidification, water scarcity, and 
biodiversity loss (Rockström et al., 2009). Since these problems manifest themselves as nega-
tive side-effects of business activities occurring along globalized systems of production and 
consumption (Buckley and Ghauri, 2004), ‘[t]he legitimacy of business has fallen to levels 
not seen in recent history’ (Porter and Kramer, 2011, p. 64). Legitimacy can be understood as 
the social acceptance of business organizations and their activities and is considered a vital 
resource for organizations (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). While the business world was initially 
reluctant to assume responsibilities for SD (Bansal, 2002; Hedstrom et al., 1998), the growing 
societal sensitivity to unsustainable business practices has motivated corporations to engage 
with the SD discourse. Therefore, many corporations have adopted sustainability principles as 
part of their mission statement in order to respond to legitimacy concerns (WBCSD, 2011).  
The globalization process has changed the institutional environment of global business 
and the way corporations can maintain their legitimacy. In a globalized world the regulatory 
power of the nation-state governance system is in decline (Beck, 2000; Cutler, 2001; Kobrin, 
2001) and cultural homogeneity within social communities is eroding due to processes of mi-
gration and individualization (Beck, 2000; Beck-Gernsheim and Beck, 2002). Under these 
conditions, which have been referred to as the postnational constellation (Habermas, 2001), 
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the power to address issues of public concern, to define standards for behaviour, and to de-
termine the conditions under which SD can unfold is shifting from state institutions to private 
actors (e.g. business firms) and civil society actors (e.g. NGOs and social movements) (Chan-
dler and Mazlish, 2005; Kobrin, 2001; Mathews, 1997; Mena and Palazzo, 2012). As a result 
the corporate environment has become highly complex and ambiguous (Child and Rodrigues, 
2011; Jones and Fleming, 2003; Smith and Lewis, 2011). Under these conditions corporations 
have difficulties in maintaining their legitimacy (Kobrin, 2009; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; 
Scherer and Palazzo, 2007). Legitimacy strategies such as simply adapting to the environment 
(isomorphic adaptation) or manipulating the perceptions of the most important social con-
stituencies (strategic manipulation) do not work as smoothly as they once did (Oliver, 1991). 
In a globalized world, accepted standards of behaviour, such as legal rules or self-regulation 
schemes (Shelton, 2000), are often fragmented or not available (Fischer-Lescano and Teub-
ner, 2004), so that the corporation has to engage in a process of moral reasoning where it is 
initially not clear whether the corporation or the societal expectations will dominate the reso-
lution, or perhaps a new position will be created (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Suchman, 1995).  
Building on the SD discourse, we challenge two assumptions about legitimacy: First, 
despite the often significant conceptual differences, the scholarly debate treats legitimacy as a 
general perception about the corporation as such (Greenwood et al., 2011), while we argue 
that legitimacy results from a variety of often parallel and contradictory perceptions of the 
corporation with regards to specific SD issues – ranging from environmental issues such as 
water scarcity to social issues such as working conditions in supplier factories. We suggest 
that dealing with SD-related legitimacy issues is particularly challenging when operating in 
fragmented and dynamic global environments with a multitude of complex and often contra-
dictory sustainability demands. 
Second, theoretical assumptions behind the different approaches – such as the re-
source-based view (Christmann, 2000; Hart, 1995), institutional theory (Bansal, 2005; Del-
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mas, 2002; Schaefer, 2007), or discourse ethics (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006) – are so contra-
dictory that the discussion gives the impression that corporations have to choose one general 
legitimacy strategy from the three options, i.e. manipulation, adaptation or moral reasoning 
(Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Suchman, 1995). In contrast, we will argue that corporations 
have all three options at their disposition and the appropriate choice depends on the particular 
issue at stake. Particularly in fragmented and dynamic global environments, which face a 
multitude of complex and often contradictory sustainability demands, there is no ‘one-best-
way’, but corporations are left with the ‘paradox’ (Smith and Lewis, 2011) of enacting all 
three strategies simultaneously. The literature offers insights into the different approaches to 
managing response strategies, especially in complex environments (Child and Rodrigues, 
2010; Pache and Santos, 2010; Simsek, 2009). However, the combination of legitimation 
strategies and their organizational prerequisites have yet to be explored (Greenwood et al., 
2011; Lamin and Zaheer, 2012). Therefore, we address two research questions: First: What 
strategies do corporations possess for dealing with SD-related legitimacy challenges and 
when are these implemented? Second: How can corporations deal with contradictory sus-
tainability demands requiring conflicting legitimacy strategies? 
We will explore the corporate responses to environmental demands and will argue that 
the legitimacy strategies of corporations are influenced mainly by two factors: the cost of or-
ganizational change and the heterogeneity of environmental demands. However, in complex 
global environments corporations face multiple legitimacy challenges at the same time, mak-
ing it necessary to respond to these challenges simultaneously by employing several response 
strategies, rather than by focusing on one comprehensive legitimacy strategy for the entire 
organization (see, e.g., Child and Rodrigues, 2010). In the literature there are three approaches 
to analyse corporate responses: the one-best-way approach, the contingency approach, and the 
paradox approach. We argue that in the face of increasingly complex and heterogeneous SD-
related demands corporations that employ a paradox approach, enabling them to switch be-
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tween or to employ simultaneously the three different legitimacy strategies, are likely to be 
most successful in preserving their legitimacy. Other than the one-best-way approach or the 
contingency approach, this allows corporations to choose the most suitable response strategy 
for each specific legitimacy challenge rather than having to stick to one response strategy for 
all legitimacy challenges.  Yet, as we will show, such a paradox approach is quite demanding, 
as it requires a capacity to handle the inherent contradictions between the different response 
strategies. We will discuss the respective structural, contextual, and reflective preconditions 
(Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010) implied by such a capacity. 
While the aim of this study is purely descriptive in the sense that we explore what 
makes some corporations more successful than others in preserving their legitimacy in com-
plex environments, the argument could easily be turned, also normatively, in the sense that if 
corporations want to be successful in that respect, they should follow the described paradox 
approach. Yet, we would like to abstain from such a normative turn as this would require a 
more elaborate discussion of wider normative-ethical concerns (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006) 
which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section we will address our first re-
search question by discussing the different legitimacy strategies and developing a framework 
for the management of corporate legitimacy in complex environments. This will be further 
elaborated in the third section where we will present anecdotal evidence of how corporations 
employ the different legitimacy strategies. In the fourth section we will address our second 
research question and discuss potential approaches (‘one best way approach’, ‘contingency 
approach’, and ‘paradox approach’) for selecting legitimacy strategies in complex environ-
ments with heterogeneous sustainability demands. We will elaborate on the paradox approach 
as the most promising and outline the preconditions for accommodating such an approach 
within the organization. We conclude with a reflection on the contributions of this study.  
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2 Managing Corporate Legitimacy in Complex Environments: A Framework 
Legitimacy can be understood as the social acceptance of actions or institutions and is as-
cribed to corporations in processes of social construction (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). Legiti-
macy is vital to corporations as it is a precondition for the continuous flow of resources and 
for securing the sustained support of the organization’s constituencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Legitimacy of corporations is challenged when their actions are perceived as inappro-
priate and undesirable within their respective societal contexts (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; 
Suchman, 1995). Suchman (1995) argues that organizational legitimacy can rest on the bene-
fits that are perceived to spring from the organization’s existence or behaviour (pragmatic 
legitimacy), or on the – often subconscious – acceptance of the organization, its structures, 
and processes, as representative of a ‘normal’ status quo (cognitive legitimacy), or on an ex-
plicit moral discourse about the acceptability of the organization and its activities (moral le-
gitimacy). In the literature, the relationship between the corporation, legitimacy, and SD has 
been explored with a focus on the pragmatic and cognitive perspective. Pragmatic legitimacy 
has been explored from a resource-based theory (Barney, 1991) and cognitive legitimacy from 
an institutional theory perspective (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Resource-based theorists em-
phasize the business case for SD (Orlitzky et al., 2011; Shrivastava, 1995; Siegel, 2009) and 
argue that certain resources and capabilities help corporations realize higher economic rents 
by contributing to SD (Christmann, 2000; Hart, 1995). From this perspective, corporations 
either provide economic benefits to their constituencies or engage in impression management 
in order to maintain their legitimacy. Institutional theorists, in turn, suggest that corporations 
strive for societal approval and respond to institutional pressures by adapting to SD principles 
(Bansal, 2005; Delmas, 2002; Jennings and Zandbergen, 1995; Schaefer, 2007).  
Business firms are considered legitimate when their organizational practices are per-
ceived to satisfy the social expectations of their environment. Normally, capitalist institutions 
such as business firms, property rights, contractual obligations etc. meet general expectations 
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about modern society, and do not raise legitimacy concerns unless everyday routines fail or 
there is a crisis. Within the capitalist system, economic institutions and processes are routi-
nized and unfold within the established and socially accepted legal rules of the economic 
game. As long as these taken-for-granted institutions and processes do not fail and are not 
questioned, they build upon cognitive legitimacy. This legitimacy is disputed if social actors 
perceive a mismatch between the corporation’s status-quo and societal expectations (see Fig-
ure 1).  
 
[Place Figure 1 about here] 
 
The postnational constellation will make such a situation more likely, as in the global 
arena MNCs operate under conditions of governance gaps resulting from global public goods 
problems (Kaul et al., 2003), incapable or unwilling national governments (Kobrin, 2001), 
insufficient regulatory power of international organizations (Beck, 2000; Habermas, 2001), 
and a lack of acceptable and coherent standards of behaviour (Chandler and Mazlish, 2005).  
We suggest that, logically, corporations have three different legitimacy strategies at 
their disposal to (re)establish the congruence between their organizational practices and socie-
tal expectations, summarised in Figure 1 (Oliver, 1991; Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Suchman, 
1995): the isomorphic adaptation strategy, the strategic manipulation strategy, and the strat-
egy of moral reasoning. The isomorphic adaptation strategy means that corporations can 
change their organizational practices and adapt to societal expectations in order to maintain 
cognitive legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996). In Figure 1 this is indicated by the arrow in the iso-
morphic adaptation box, which points from societal expectations to organizational practice. 
Such a scenario might arise when corporations change their practices to meet the interests and 
legitimacy concerns of their most powerful stakeholder groups (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
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The strategic manipulation strategy describes cases where corporations actively influ-
ence social expectations by swaying or even manipulating the perceptions of key actors or 
policy-makers in their environment (Barley, 2010; Child and Rodrigues, 2011; Oliver, 1991). 
The notion of ‘manipulation’ refers to ‘the active attempt to alter the content of institutional 
requirements and to influence their promoters’ (Pache and Santos, 2010, p. 463). Here, socie-
tal expectations are mainly shaped by the corporation’s political strategy (Hillman et al., 
2004), which in Figure 1 is indicated by the respective arrow in the strategic manipulation 
box. The corporation attempts to influence these expectations through advertising campaigns, 
the dissemination of (mis)information, lobbying, and other instruments of strategic public 
relations and impression management (Barley, 2010; Fombrun, 2001; Oliver, 1991). 
The third strategy, that of moral reasoning, builds upon a process of deliberation. The 
organization engages in an open discourse with focal stakeholders or societal groups in order 
to argue for the acceptability of its status quo and behaviour (Habermas, 1990; Scherer and 
Palazzo, 2007). Both parties consider the pros and cons of their positions and try to find a 
common solution that is based on a sound argument and serves the well-being of society 
rather than egoistic motives or narrow interests. This mode of interaction ‘reflects a pro-social 
logic that differs fundamentally from narrow self-interest’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 579). Unlike 
persuasion strategies, which aim to establish one’s own position by manipulating the other 
party’s position, moral reasoning means that the two parties try to learn from each other and 
eventually adapt their positions constructively. The aim is to reach a consensus (or at least an 
informed compromise) and ultimately a new match between organizational practices and so-
cietal expectations that will (re)establish legitimacy (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006).  
The key difference between the moral, adaptive and manipulative strategies of legiti-
macy lies in their respective assumptions about the locus of control. While the manipulative 
view puts forward that the corporation can influence how its key constituencies perceive its 
legitimacy, the adaptive view builds on the assumption that the corporation is subject to the 
 9  
          
control of surrounding institutional pressures and routines. The moral legitimacy view, in 
turn, argues that legitimacy results from the discourses that connect organizations with their 
environment. Whether these legitimacy strategies are mutually exclusive and whether they 
could or even should be combined has yet to be resolved (Lamin and Zaheer, 2012).  
Corporations opt for either the isomorphic adaptation strategy or the manipulation 
strategy primarily in order to maintain their legitimacy. Occasionally, these strategies are 
complemented or even substituted by moral reasoning. In line with the economic and institu-
tional approaches, we expect that the particular choice of legitimacy strategy can be explained 
on the basis of two factors: (a) the costs of organizational change, i.e. the costs incurred by 
making necessary changes to a corporation’s structure and processes so that they match socie-
tal expectations and contribute to sustainable development (McWilliams et al., 2006; Hart, 
1995); (b) the consistency of societal expectations to which the corporation has to respond 
when attempting to (re)establish its legitimacy. The latter factor draws on institutional theory 
(Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache and Santos, 2010; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) and the the-
ory of paradox (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989; Smith and Lewis, 2011).  
(a) A failure of organizational routine that reduces the social acceptability of a corporation 
and its behaviour will incur costs in the form of time, labour, and assets that are necessary in 
order to resolve the misfit between organizational practice and societal expectations. In order 
to respond to sustainability issues that are put forward by societal stakeholder groups, corpo-
rations have to rearrange their value chains (e.g. stop sourcing from countries with undemo-
cratic regimes), change their production processes or product technologies (e.g. implement 
green technologies), or spend resources (e.g. invest in infrastructure and public goods such as 
public transportation, education, or security in host countries where public authorities are not 
able or willing to do so) in order to preserve the natural environment or protect human rights. 
The cost dimension is emphasized by the theory of the firm perspective on CSR: corporations 
invest in corporate sustainability and protect their legitimacy as long as the benefits exceed or 
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at least equal the costs (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Orlitzky et al., 2011; Siegel, 2009; 
Springle and Maines, 2010). Likewise, resource-based theory argues that corporations may 
achieve a favourable position in competition when they develop specific competences to pur-
sue a sustainability strategy (Barney, 1991; Christmann, 2000; Hart, 1995). For other corpora-
tions such competences represent an entry barrier and overcoming this incurs costs.  
(b) MNCs have extended their activities to countries and cultures that have different societal 
and institutional conditions. As global actors, they are exposed to two contradictory pressures: 
on the one hand, globalization promotes a transnational standardization of rules and (mainly 
soft law) regulation (Brunsson et al., 2012; Gilbert et al., 2011). On the other hand, the diver-
sity of local contexts in which MNCs operate creates institutional contradictions: ‘the global-
ization of practices and cultures increasingly exposes organizations to the simultaneous influ-
ence of local and global institutional pressures. Local regulative, cognitive, and cultural influ-
ences interfere with national and global trends toward homogenization of rules, values, and 
practices’ (Pache and Santos, 2010, p. 471). As a result, corporations are confronted with a 
multitude of expectations from primary stakeholders, such as company owners, employees, 
customers, or suppliers, and from secondary stakeholders, such as NGOs or activists, local 
communities, or governments (Waddock et al., 2002), as well as with pressure from a variety 
of international institutions (Waddock, 2008). The fact that this simultaneous tendency to-
wards more homogeneity and more heterogeneity is becoming manifest in various local and 
global expectations creates tensions. Under these conditions, companies seek accepted stan-
dards of behaviour (e.g. with respect to sustainability issues), which provide a level playing 
field, incur the same costs to all companies within an industry, and at the same time provide 
them with legitimacy (Haack et al., 2012). However, such standards are fragmented and only 
partially, if at all, available in every industry, every region, or on every sustainability issue 
(Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, 2004). As a result, MNCs operate under conditions of com-
plexity and may often face highly heterogeneous expectations from their societal and institu-
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tional environment (Child and Rodrigues, 2011; Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Smith and Lewis, 
2011). 
Under conditions of consistent social expectations and/or widely accepted standards of 
behaviour, corporations tend to choose adaptation strategies when the costs of organizational 
change are low and active manipulation strategies when these costs are high. In the latter case, 
corporations engage in decoupling (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008); for example, they at-
tempt to leave the organizational machinery as it is and create a positive public image by sim-
ply evoking the impression of complying with established standards, with the help of public 
relations and manipulation strategies. This way they simply appear legitimate in the eyes of 
key stakeholders or policy makers (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Barley, 2010) even though 
their processes have not changed. This tendency is more pronounced when corporations have 
the power to actively influence their environment (Child and Rodrigues, 2011) and when the 
societal expectations are not represented within the company – e.g. when there are no organ-
izational members that feel responsible for social or environmental issues (Pache and Santos, 
2010).  
Corporations that employ manipulation strategies do not modify the practices that 
some of their stakeholders criticize; instead, they manipulate the perception of those stake-
holders in order to avoid the pressure. While such strategies of decoupling and impression 
management are discussed critically in the business and society literature (Palazzo and Rich-
ter, 2005; Weaver et al., 1999), it is important to highlight here that they are neither good nor 
bad in normative terms. As we will argue later on, external demands can be based on unrealis-
tic claims, poor data, or misunderstandings (Teegen et al., 2004) and may often collide with 
the expectations of other stakeholders (Calton and Payne, 2003; Pache and Santos, 2010). A 
corporation can apply strategic manipulation or isomorphic adaptation to a wide range of 
situations in order to maintain its legitimacy. However, both strategies have limitations and 
may fail under certain conditions. There is always the danger that a corporation’s attempts to 
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manipulate perceptions may be uncovered, which may have the opposite effect and damage 
the corporation’s legitimacy (Patriotta et al., 2011).  
Even though there is some evidence that strategic manipulation is often successful 
(Barley, 2010), the cases of Enron (fraudulent book-keeping, Ley Toffler and Reingold, 2003; 
Time Magazine, 2002), Siemens (widespread corruption; New York Times, 2008), or BP 
(highly risky tactics and a disregard for safety standards; New York Times, 2011) are a re-
minder that once the image of legitimacy is exposed as a façade, the consequences for com-
panies and top managers in terms of cost and reputation can be disastrous. In all three cases 
the corporations had created positive public images with the help of public relations (Kauf-
mann, 2008; Murphy, 2008; Muralidharan et al., 2011). However, as the scandals associated 
with these corporations have shown, none had actually implemented its publicly announced 
CSR and sustainability policies by sufficiently changing its corporate structures and practices. 
These scandals were the result of misconduct by individuals, as well as of systematic prob-
lems with incentives and control within the companies. Strategic manipulation and keeping up 
a façade are more likely to fail when there is anti-corporate action by NGOs and stakeholder 
activists (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Teegen et al., 2004) and when transparency is high 
and information can be readily disseminated to the relevant public via the media (e.g. the 
Internet or news agencies) (Patriotta et al., 2011).  
A strategy of adaptation may also fail if the organization faces many heterogeneous 
and contradictory expectations (Lamin and Zaheer, 2012). In such cases, adapting to the ex-
pectations of one part of the social environment is likely to clash with the expectations of 
other societal sectors: ‘in conflict situations plain compliance is problematic, since complying 
with one demand requires defying the competing other(s)’ (Pache and Santos, 2010, p. 463). 
Palazzo and Scherer (2006) have argued that during the process of globalization the societal 
environment of multinational firms has become fragmented and heterogeneous and industry 
standards and self-regulation schemes are often not yet available, but first need to be devel-
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oped. Under these conditions, adaptation strategies are insufficient for maintaining corporate 
legitimacy. By contrast, in cases of low consistency of societal expectations, strategic ma-
nipulation as well as moral reasoning strategies can be applied selectively to certain stake-
holder groups in order to address their legitimacy concerns, either by means of manipulation 
or argumentation. Manipulation strategies, however, may prove insufficient: the corporation 
may not be able to actually influence the relevant societal groups in the first place, while the 
widespread availability of information and communication means that corporate manipulation 
strategies may be easily discovered and circumvented. Under such conditions moral reasoning 
will become more important for managing corporate legitimacy (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). 
However, we suggest that moral reasoning cannot completely substitute adaptation 
and strategic action. The complexity of the corporation’s steering task in competitive market 
societies would overburden the corporation in its strategic course if only moral reasoning was 
available as a means of establishing legitimacy. Therefore, moral reasoning has to be regarded 
as a retreat strategy when the mechanisms of social routine, adaptation, and manipulation fail, 
or as a proactive strategy for establishing relationships of trust with the corporation’s con-
stituencies or for addressing emerging sustainability issues that may erode the corporation’s 
legitimacy in the future. Moral reasoning may be appropriate when societal expectations are 
heterogeneous and corporations engage in moral discourse with particular societal groups in 
order to selectively address and eventually satisfy their demands (Calton and Payne, 2003). 
Unlike the adaptation strategy, moral reasoning can be applied selectively to particular stake-
holder groups and this will not necessarily lead to a mismatch with the expectations of other 
groups. However, moral reasoning is costly and requires particular efforts from those who 
engage in it. Therefore, it cannot entirely substitute social routines, isomorphic adaptation, 
and strategic manipulation, which often help corporations tackle the legitimacy challenges of 
competitive environments more efficiently. What is more, in a globalized world the environ-
mental challenges and societal demands to which companies have to respond are in ‘continual 
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flux’ (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 319). This means that MNCs are increasingly required to be 
able to simultaneously apply or to switch between the different legitimacy strategies (i.e. ma-
nipulation, adaptation and moral reasoning) in order to be able to preserve their legitimacy. 
However, before we get to this issue in detail, we will first illustrate the advantages and limi-
tations of the legitimacy strategies with regards to SD decisions in corporations. 
3. Empirical Illustration of Legitimacy Strategies with regards to SD issues 
How can corporations react to legitimacy challenges due to sustainability problems? In a 
highly complex environment, under time pressure, with no acceptable standards of behaviour 
available, with little or no experience of how to handle the issue at stake and confronted with 
contradictory expectations and aggressive campaigning, it is far from clear which legitimacy 
strategy is best (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache and Santos, 2010). The following examples 
aim to illustrate the contributions and limitations of various legitimacy strategies and to argue 
in favour of their combination under conditions of complex and heterogeneous environments. 
The case of Chiquita Brands International illustrates how strategic manipulation 
strategies might be successfully employed. Chiquita has been exposed to harsh criticism in 
the German, Swiss and Swedish mass media for its cooperation with the Rainforest Alliance. 
It was argued that the social and environmental standards of this civil society coalition were 
not sufficiently high. For instance, critics argued that as long as pesticides were used on the 
plantations, announcements about the reduction of pesticide use were mere window-dressing 
(DER SPIEGEL, 2006, 2008; Macquet and Kjellberg, 2011). How should the corporation re-
act? On the one hand, Chiquita used to be considered a CSR leader and their partner, the 
Rainforest Alliance, is an expert NGO that has been working with Chiquita over several years 
and has also been a key player in various standard-setting, labelling, and monitoring initia-
tives. On the other hand, the credibility of this engagement and the reputation of the corpora-
tion were repeatedly challenged. Here it might make sense to react by adopting a strategic 
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public relations approach if, first, the corporation already employs a credible moral reasoning 
strategy, second, if the accusations can be refuted, or, third, if the costs of implementing 
changes are too high (such costs could result e.g. from fulfilling the demand that the company 
immediately reduces the use of pesticides to zero).  
Criticism of a corporation’s practices might find broad public support even if it builds 
on false claims or unrealistic expectations (e.g. the idea that a large corporation could switch 
to a fair trade scheme or phase out a certain pesticide in a couple of weeks). In such a case, 
corporations might choose to defend their current sustainability engagement against criticism 
instead of complying with their opponents’ demands (Christmann and Taylor, 2002; Oliver, 
1991). Critique may not be advanced in a way that it constitutes a concrete alternative option 
for the corporation: the Chiquita banana has for instance been accused of being less fair than 
the fair trade banana and less green than the organic banana. Yet, applying fair trade and or-
ganic criteria on large plantations might be very difficult, if not impossible from a technical 
perspective. However, moral reasoning might be chosen as a retreat strategy if the attempt to 
re-establish corporate credibility by influencing public opinion fails and relevant and power-
ful actors join the critics. In such a case it might be very risky to carry on using strategic pub-
lic relations as a means of tackling the situation (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). 
The appropriateness of an isomorphic adaptation strategy is evident in the examples 
we will discuss below. As mentioned earlier, some companies choose a proactive moral rea-
soning strategy, which may involve setting and controlling new standards for sustainable sup-
ply chain management in cooperation with civil society organizations (Bäckstrand, 2006; 
Basu and Palazzo, 2008). As soon as a major actor or at least a few actors in an industry take 
such steps, it makes sense for competitors or other industries to adapt to the emerging institu-
tional context (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). For instance, while Nike’s decision to publish 
the names of its supply-chain partners was a proactive move that might be interpreted as the 
result of the company’s interaction with civil-society critics, the decision of Puma and Adidas 
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to do the same a few days later can be interpreted as an isomorphic adaptation to a new stan-
dard (Doorey, 2011). If a new behavioural standard is established that does (or presumably 
will) meet with broad public acceptance, it might make sense for companies to adapt it to 
their specific circumstances, instead of going through the long process of devising similar 
standards with similar partners, which the strategy of moral reasoning would require. 
Nespresso’s (Alvarez et al., 2010) and McDonald’s (McDonald’s, 2007) decisions to work 
with the Rainforest Alliance in order to improve the environmental conditions of coffee pro-
duction in their supply chain can be interpreted as the result of an isomorphic adaptation strat-
egy. The Rainforest Alliance has been working with other MNCs on environmental standards 
since the early 1990s and has developed a largely accepted (even though not undisputed) set 
of criteria for sustainable agriculture. If the introduction of standards is costly this may pre-
vent corporations from adapting to societal demands (Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010). 
However, if the pressure from societal groups is high, corporations may decide to adapt to 
societal demands despite costs: if these standards become established across an entire indus-
try, the costs of organizational change will be redefined as costs of doing business that apply 
to all competitors. Again, in such a scenario moral reasoning might be chosen as a retreat 
strategy if the legitimacy of the standard is disputed or alternative and more credible options 
emerge.  
While the discussion above outlines certain conditions under which manipulation or 
adaptation strategies might make sense as a first reaction to routine failures, choosing either 
strategy in reaction to changing expectations and challenged practices clearly has its limits. 
The following examples illustrate the limitations of the manipulation or adaptation strategies. 
The limitations of isomorphic adaptation are obvious in the case of Yahoo (Brenkert, 
2009), which can be considered as an instance of the fragmentation of law in the corporate 
environment (Benvenisti and Downs, 2007). As Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2004, p. 1004) 
point out, ‘the fragmentation of global law is not simply about legal norm collisions or policy-
 17  
          
conflicts, but rather has its origin in contradictions between society-wide institutionalized 
rationalities, which law cannot solve’. Yahoo has expanded its operations to China. In 2002, 
Yahoo signed the ‘Public pledge on self-discipline for the Chinese Internet industry’, which is 
sponsored by the government-affiliated Internet Society for China. Together with other Inter-
net providers, the company was accused of being the gatekeeper for an oppressive govern-
ment by the Human Rights Watch and other NGOs. In addition, two Chinese journalists were 
sentenced to ten years in jail because Yahoo disclosed their email addresses to the Chinese 
government (Brenkert, 2009; Dann and Haddow, 2008). This prompted much criticism, in 
reaction to which Yahoo argued that the company ‘must ensure that its local country sites 
must operate within the local laws, regulations, and customs’ (BBC, 2005). Torn between the 
expectations of (mainly Western) public audiences and those of the Chinese government, the 
company chose to adapt to the local rules, thereby not only provoking worldwide indignation, 
but also triggering a hearing in the US Congress on the complicity of Internet companies in 
human rights violations in China. Having ignored the moral dimension of its decision to co-
operate with local authorities and chosen to adopt routines that are approved in other political 
contexts, the company found itself trapped in a legitimacy crisis. Generally speaking, an iso-
morphic adaptation strategy may be considered inappropriate in cases of colliding standards 
that represent conflicting political, cultural or economic forces (Pache and Santos, 2010).  
Likewise, the limitations of strategic manipulation are evident in the case of Wal-
Mart: for several years now, Wal-Mart has been under pressure to address the social and envi-
ronmental side effects of its business practices (Beaver, 2005). The campaign against the 
company culminated in Robert Greenwald’s 2005 documentary entitled ‘Wal-Mart: The High 
Cost of Low Price’. In reaction to the massive criticism, the corporation launched a large-
scale advertising campaign aimed at presenting the arguments of its opponents as false and 
insisted that the public ought to have access to the correct ‘facts’ (Ethical Corporation, 2005). 
However, this PR campaign did not solve Wal-Mart’s problems but rather contributed to its 
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legitimacy crisis. In response, the company then switched to a retreat strategy, initiating a 
discourse on environmental questions, such as CO2 emissions, water consumption, or the re-
duction of waste, with experts critical of its practices and announcing that it would make a 
$500 million investment in greening its supply chain. Recently, Wal-Mart has again been ac-
cused of greenwashing, because they have not seriously advanced on implementing their 
greening strategy, and they have not sufficiently engaged with civil society (Mitchell, 2012). 
In general, the success of strategic manipulation depends on the ability of the corporation to 
impose its views on the critics or society at large. Repairing or maintaining legitimacy 
through strategic manipulation is a high-risk strategy if there is overwhelming evidence in 
support of the opponents’ position or if the opponents’ credibility is much higher than that of 
the corporation. In the case of Wal-Mart, it can be assumed that the corporation chose a stra-
tegic manipulation strategy to start with, instead of adapting to societal expectations, in order 
to avoid the costs of organizational change. However, refusing to adapt to consistent societal 
expectations can be dangerous and counterproductive for companies. 
The above examples provide some empirical evidence that supports our approach de-
veloped in Section 2. As explained further up, there are mainly two factors that influence the 
choice of legitimacy strategy: the consistency of environmental expectations and the costs of 
organizational change. When routines fail, organizations are often expected to change. How-
ever, the costs of change can be so high that corporations are more likely to decide to resist 
external expectations and to attempt to influence key stakeholders through strategic manipula-
tion instead (Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010). In contrast, when the costs of change are 
low, corporations might choose to adapt quickly to expectations if the new standards of be-
haviour are visible and univocal. In the case of Nike, for instance, the decision to publish its 
list of suppliers was highly risky because it provided the competitors with information about 
Nike’s partners and this might have affected the corporation’s competitiveness. The decision 
made by Puma and Adidas to follow Nike’s example, however, was not as risky. Besides the 
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costs of change, the pressure of external expectations also influences the choice of legitimacy 
strategies. If those expectations are clear and unambiguous, they promote adaptation. If they 
are heterogeneous, fragmented, and contradictory, corporations might have a greater incentive 
to engage in moral reasoning, even if the costs of change seem to be high. High costs of 
change and low consistency of expectations might favour the choice of strategic manipulation 
or of moral reasoning, if corporations are confronted with legitimacy issues.  
In the context of the postnational constellation, corporations have to find answers to 
the rising tide of legitimacy challenges. This does not mean that they should switch automati-
cally from pragmatic and cognitive to moral legitimacy. Instead, corporations have to develop 
the necessary sensitivity for identifying the appropriate strategy and the right mix of the three 
options open to them. The appropriateness of strategic choices with regard to legitimacy 
might also change over time so that the corporation will sequentially change its legitimacy 
strategies accordingly. In t1, a corporation might decide to develop a solution for a sustainabil-
ity problem through discussion, while in t2, if such a standard is already established and 
widely accepted, the organization might decide to adapt to the standard without further dia-
logue (see Figure 1). And a second example, in t1 a corporation might develop an innovative 
solution for a sustainability challenge (e.g. pioneering the analysis of the life cycle of a spe-
cific product) and launch a marketing strategy that centres on this innovation, while in t2 it 
might join a multi-stakeholder initiative and engage in an industry-wide discourse in order to 
establish the very same innovation as an industry standard. As Child and Rodrigues (2011) 
have argued, the ability to learn is crucial for companies operating in complex situations. 
There may even be a situation where a company is facing a multitude of sustainability 
issues and contradicting societal expectations simultaneously. Thus, the corporation might be 
required to manipulate the societal environment, to adapt to social expectations and to engage 
in stakeholder dialogues at the same time. The challenge, here, will be to balance the inherent 
contradictions between these strategies and their organizational prerequisites in order not to 
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lose trust and credibility and, thus, legitimacy. The sports manufacturer Puma, for example, 
applies all three legitimacy strategies simultaneously in its SD engagement: (1) For several 
years now, Puma has applied a moral reasoning strategy by establishing a stakeholder dia-
logue in which they bring together representatives of the Fair Labor Association, critical 
NGOs, scientists and factory managers in order to deliberate on the social and environmental 
challenges in their supply chain (Roloff, 2008; Steinmann, 2010). If done seriously as a moral 
reasoning strategy, this means that the views of all parties are open to discourse. (2) At the 
same time, Puma has also followed an adaptation strategy. As already mentioned, a key con-
cern of NGOs regarding SD is the transparency of the supply chain and when Nike decided to 
publish its list of suppliers, Puma gave up its resistance against disclosing their suppliers and 
followed suit. This means that Puma gave up its own views on the issue and just adapted to 
the external expectations. (3) However, Puma also followed a manipulation strategy. Re-
cently, the company has developed a new and innovative environmental profit and loss ac-
count to quantify the true environmental costs of its products and production activities. Real-
izing that consumers are not overly interested in such sustainability efforts when making their 
buying decisions, Puma has decided that the transformation of consumer habits should be-
come a key element of their sustainability strategy (Marketingmagazine, 2010).  If taken seri-
ously, this means that Puma is sticking to its own views regarding sustainability issues and 
trying to impose it on their stakeholders. Such simultaneously used legitimacy strategies ob-
viously will create tensions. For instance, a marketing strategy that is meant to educate con-
sumers on sustainability might irritate NGOs with whom the company leads a dialogue on 
worker rights. Such NGOs might perceive the SD performance as not advanced enough to be 
marketed and they might come under pressure from their own audiences for collaborating 
with the corporation. 
Companies such as Puma must find a way of coping with the conflicts between the 
different legitimacy strategies when employing them simultaneously in their overarching SD 
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strategy. These contradictions result from the fact that managers who try to combine the three 
legitimacy strategies at the same time, will have to be open to change their own positions in 
line with external positions, to defend their positions by imposing them on their stakeholders 
and by leaving the resolution between conflicting positions up to open discourses. As we will 
argue in the next section, this requires organizations to adopt the so-called ’paradox approach’ 
(Smith and Lewis, 2011) to managing their response strategies.  
4. The Paradox of Accommodating Conflicting Legitimacy Strategies 
The empirical examples presented above demonstrate that all three legitimacy strategies with 
regards to the corporate contribution to SD have their particular advantages and weaknesses. 
As the cases illustrate, some strategies seem to work better in certain situations than in others. 
In view of that, the crucial question for organizations is how to select and to combine the most 
appropriate legitimacy strategies. In principle, there are three possible approaches to respond-
ing to legitimacy demands in complex environments: (1) the ‘one best way’ approach, (2) the 
contingency approach, and (3) the paradox approach. 
The ‘one best way’ approach assumes that even though organizations face different 
situations, there is ultimately one best way of responding to legitimacy threats. Examples of 
this position can be found in the literature: Ulrich (2008), for instance, maintains that all le-
gitimacy concerns with regards to SD should be dealt with discursively so that consensual 
solutions can be generated. In particular, corporations should refrain from strategic political 
action and from manipulating the corporate environment (Ulrich, 2000). A very different ex-
ample of this ‘one best way’ approach is the study by Siegel (2009), who regards strategic 
manipulation as the preferred legitimacy strategy. He argues that corporations should always 
stress the economic role of the business firm when engaging with green strategies. According 
to his view, corporations are not directly responsible for advancing the social good, but for 
being productive and generating profits; it is ultimately up to governmental institutions to 
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develop an appropriate regulatory framework that safeguards the social good (Sundaram and 
Inkpen, 2004). Corporations maintain their legitimacy by providing economic value to their 
owners (shareholders) or at least by influencing their perceptions and – indirectly – by con-
tributing to society and sustainable development via the allocation function of markets.  
Although attractive due to its simplicity, we would argue that the ‘one best way’ ap-
proach is highly problematic as it has serious shortcomings. First, its premises rest on idealis-
tic assumptions about contextual conditions such as the readiness of organizational members 
and stakeholders to engage in a constructive discourse, the capacity of governmental institu-
tions to set appropriate regulatory frameworks, or the allocation function of markets. Second, 
the approach tends to overlook the possibility that the envisioned solutions cannot always be 
realized: the various parties may not always reach consensus nor is it always possible to make 
the business case for the issue at hand (van den Hove, 2006). Third, the focus on a single le-
gitimacy strategy seems like an unnecessary restriction, given that each of the three strategies 
has its own strengths and that companies are generally capable of employing more than one 
strategy. The assumption that corporations can always manipulate public discourse success-
fully in their favour when their legitimacy is in question is as naïve as assuming that consen-
sus may be reached in any situation of conflict. Overall, the ‘one best way’ approach does not 
seem to tap the full potential of legitimacy strategies that corporations have at their disposal.  
A more promising approach than the ‘one best way’ approach is the contingency ap-
proach. This approach can also be found in the literature on the management of corporate 
responses to legitimacy issues (Christmann and Taylor, 2002; Oliver, 1991) or to complex 
and heterogeneous environments (Child and Rodrigues, 2011; Pache and Santos, 2010; Sir-
mon et al., 2007). The focus, here, is on the different strengths and weaknesses of each strat-
egy in relation to different circumstances. The assumption that there is one strategy that fits 
all situations is refuted. Instead it is argued that, while there is one ‘best way’ for each situa-
tion, this will vary depending on the particular circumstances. Corporations need to identify 
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the one way that best fits a specific situation in order to achieve ‘congruence’ between the 
environmental challenge and their strategic response (Hambrick, 1983; Simsek, 2009). 
Adapting to the environment in order to create ‘an acceptable fit’ (Hambrick, 1983; 
Sirmon et al., 2007, p. 275) and aligning organizational structures and processes to create in-
ternal ‘harmony’ (Sirmon et al., 2007, p. 287) are central to contingency theory. Child and 
Rodrigues (2011), for example, argue that the choice of strategy in response to environmental 
demands depends on a corporation’s relative power. They suggest that less powerful corpora-
tions are limited to a single strategy while more powerful companies have greater choice, but 
finally focus on only one out of the set of available strategies to deal with environmental 
complexity. Pache and Santos (2010) suggest that the organizational response depends on two 
factors: the nature of environmental demands (conflict of goals vs. conflict of means) and the 
representation of these demands within the organization (whether there is a single representa-
tion, multiple representations, or no representation). These authors assume that the environ-
mental contingency factors determine the selection of the response strategy, and that this 
strategy resolves conflicts and balances heterogeneous demands.  
Even though the contingency approach is more sophisticated than the ‘one best way’ 
approach, its limitations are apparent in cases characterized by extreme degrees of environ-
mental dynamism, complexity, and heterogeneity of societal demands. Under such conditions 
it is not possible to assume that there is ‘one best way’ for any given situation. On the con-
trary, it is more likely that corporations will continuously need to balance equifinal alterna-
tives that only lead to suboptimal solutions (Gresov and Drazin, 1997). The inherent dynamic 
of the environment keeps societal demands in ‘continual flux’ (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 
319), demanding ‘flexibility and agile actions’ (Simsek, 2009, p. 614) from the corporation. 
This means that a legitimacy strategy may immediately become obsolete and require corpora-
tions to respond with ‘organizational fluidity’ (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010).  
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Likewise, if the inherent contradictions in environmental challenges and corporate re-
sponses prevail (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004), contradiction and conflict may be the rule, 
rather than the exception, in the process of managing legitimacy. Acknowledging this, Simsek 
(2009, p. 618) points to the limitations of his own contingency approach as ‘new opportunities 
(and threats) are constantly created by the organization’s internal and external dynamics’, 
which means that the organization ‘may never achieve a lasting balance’. Moreover, ‘there is 
not just one but many institutional environments’ (Scott, 1991, p. 167) with incompatible de-
mands and the corporation has to respond to these by activating different legitimacy strategies 
at the same time. However, as Greenwood et al. have observed (2011, p. 351), ‘most empiri-
cal studies assume or imply that organizations enact single and sustainable responses. In do-
ing so, they largely ignore the fact that “different subunits […] find heterodox ways of re-
sponding to the accountability demands of [their] environment” (Binder, 2007, p. 567).’  
A direct response to the shortcomings of the contingency approach is the so-called 
paradox approach. It suggests that organizations can employ different response strategies 
simultaneously even where these are in conflict with each other; thereby, replacing the ei-
ther/or logic of the contingency approach with a both/and perspective (Lewis, 2000). As vari-
ous researchers have stressed (e.g. Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010; Smith and Lewis, 2011), 
organizations are nowadays increasingly faced with conditions (such as high dynamism, het-
erogeneity, and complexity) where a simple contingency approach requiring organizations to 
choose between different strategies will no longer suffice. Instead, organizations need to learn 
to accommodate conflicts between their environmental strategies. As Smith and Lewis write: 
‘Today, as globalization, innovation, hyper-competition, and social demands create more dy-
namic and intricate environments, paradox becomes a critical theoretical lens’ that can be 
used ‘to […] lead contemporary organizations’ (2011, p. 398). In terms of the three different 
types of legitimacy strategies, this means that organizations do not choose between different 
strategies but employ all three strategies at the same time. That is, the organization is simulta-
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neously prepared to defend its own position by trying to impose its views on its critics (strate-
gic manipulation), to uncritically accept the views of its critics (isomorphic adaptation) and 
also to engage in an honest, open discourse about what course to take (moral reasoning). Em-
ploying these three response strategies simultaneously obviously creates internal (and exter-
nal) tensions and contradictions. Analogous to the case where organizations employ simulta-
neously strategies of pattern maintenance and fluidity (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010) or 
strategies of knowledge exploitation and knowledge exploration (Raisch et al., 2009), corpo-
rations are faced with the dilemma of both fixing their own points of view as basis for chang-
ing the environment (strategic manipulation), of treating their own points of view as flexible 
and subject to environmental expectations (isomorphic adaptation) or as subject to an open 
deliberation (moral reasoning). As such, there is no stable point of reference according to 
which to operate within the organization; the point of reference is both inside, outside, and in 
the deliberation. Thus, other than in the case of the other two approaches (one-best-way ap-
proach and contingency approach), the organization has to be able to switch between points of 
reference without a stable point of reference with which to decide which point of reference to 
choose (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010). This obviously presupposes an ability of organizations 
to master paradoxical tensions. 
Of the three approaches to selecting legitimacy strategies presented here, the paradox 
approach seems to be the most suitable one in the context of the postnational constellation and 
the corporate contribution to SD (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007, 2011). This does not imply that 
the insights of the contingency approach are invalid. Instead, the paradox approach can be 
understood as an extension of the contingency approach, which can be applied in situations 
where environmental demands are characterized by high dynamism, complexity and hetero-
geneity (Smith and Lewis, 2011). In this sense, our own framework of legitimacy strategies, 
discussed in the second section of this paper, incorporates aspects of contingency theory in 
the description of the advantages that different strategies have in relation to different contex-
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tual factors. Yet, in the setting that the postnational constellation describes, corporations will 
typically have to mix different strategies in order to ensure their sustainability. In contrast to 
what the contingency approach would suggest, there is no general solution to the problem of 
strategy selection that can be applied in advance (Lewis, 2000; Smith and Lewis, 2011). Or-
ganizations can merely develop the organizational and individual capabilities necessary for 
activating the various modes of generating legitimacy, and they will have to determine the 
mix of legitimacy strategies anew for each concrete situation they face (see Greenwood et al., 
2011). 
Creating the organizational preconditions for activating each of the three legitimacy 
strategies simultaneously poses a significant challenge for corporations. Corporations that try 
to develop the ability to activate all three legitimacy strategies simultaneously are typically 
confronted with the paradox of meeting opposing structural demands. Building on the existing 
literature on organizational paradoxes, we can distinguish three different ways in which or-
ganizations can accommodate the various strategies (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010): first, 
structural solutions (Gilbert, 2005; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996; for overviews see Green-
wood et al., 2011; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008); second, contextual solutions (Gibson and 
Birkinshaw 2004; Smith and Tushman, 2005; for an overview see Greenwood et al., 2011; 
Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008); third, solutions based on reflection capacities (Schreyögg and 
Kliesch-Eberl, 2007; Schreyögg and Steinmann, 1987; Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010). These 
solutions are helpful for understanding how companies can manage different legitimacy 
strategies. These ideas have not yet been applied to legitimacy issues related to SD. 
Structural solutions deal with conflicting organizational functions by means of ‘struc-
tural separation’ (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, p. 210). This entails putting in place a range 
of structures so that the different units or groups within the organization focus on different 
functions (Adler et al., 1999; Delmas and Toffler, 2008; Kraatz and Block, 2008; Tushman 
and O’Reilly, 1996). More precisely, this enables organizations to dedicate different units or 
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groups to different legitimacy strategies. For example, marketing and public relations depart-
ments may focus on strategic manipulation (Christensen, 1995), while specialized groups may 
coordinate an open dialogue with stakeholders in the context of a moral reasoning strategy in 
order to address sustainability issues (Payne and Calton, 2004). At the same time, other 
groups or units, such as investor relations, may be tightly coupled to specific stakeholders, 
ensuring the timely recognition of changes in the latter’s perceptions and managing the re-
spective adaptation processes within the organization (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). In this 
scenario, each unit or group specializes in a particular legitimacy strategy; thus, it is not ex-
posed to the tensions between the different strategies. However, as critics have pointed out 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Greenwood et al., 2011), such structural solutions merely shift 
the tension between the different functional requirements to other levels without resolving the 
question of how the activities of the various units or groups should be coordinated. As 
Schreyögg and Sydow write: ‘Strict separation is likely to result in sharp interfaces, ambigu-
ous priorities and a lack of a common orientation’ (2011, p. 1257) and is thus not sufficient 
for balancing paradoxical demands. 
Contextual solutions, in contrast, create an internal organizational context that encour-
ages individuals to make their own judgments about sustainability issues and about which 
actions are the most appropriate in a given situation, and also ‘“to do whatever it takes” to 
deliver results’ (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, p. 213). The management of the tension be-
tween different requirements is thus shifted to the level of the individual. Contextual solutions 
require ‘ambitextrous leaders […] who are able to understand, and are sensitive to, the expec-
tations and requirements of constituencies of multiple logics’ (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 356) 
and who also encourage organizational members to use their own judgment. In terms of or-
ganizational design, the only requirement is that the organization must create the appropriate 
contextual conditions, i.e. discipline, stretch, support and trust (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008) 
that will help stimulate specific behavioural competences. Thus, this approach allows each 
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individual to decide in each concrete situation whether to apply strategic manipulation, iso-
morphic adaptation, or moral reasoning in order to address the legitimacy issues involved in 
the corporation’s contribution to SD. However, this solution also has its shortcomings. In par-
ticular, it has been pointed out that the focus on the individual ‘overstretches the behavioural 
flexibility of individual members’ (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010, p. 1259). Individuals have 
their cognitive limits (Raisch et al., 2009) and their behaviour is influenced by organizational 
routines, so it is unlikely that providing a stimulating context suffices to ensure that the mem-
bers of the organization select the appropriate response strategies to legitimacy demands. 
Developing internal reflection capacities offers another approach to dealing with the 
paradoxical tensions mentioned above. For this purpose, the corporation creates internal plat-
forms for ‘meta-level processes’ (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010, p. 1259). These platforms 
allow the company to select appropriate response strategies to legitimacy challenges that are 
linked to the corporation’s contribution to sustainability. These meta-level processes might be 
located on different organizational levels. For example, legitimacy challenges might be ini-
tially discussed on the level of the particular subunit in which they have come up; however, if 
the participants come to the conclusion that the particular challenge and potential responses to 
it also concern other parts of the organization, the discourse on the topic might be shifted to 
higher organizational levels that encompass a broader set of organizational members (e.g. 
representatives of the different parts of the organization). This has the advantage of allowing 
for both direct, localized responses and more coordinated responses among various parts of 
the organization.  
Like the other approaches to managing paradoxical tensions, this approach also has 
some shortcomings. First, it is probably unrealistic to assume that it would be possible to hold 
an internal reflective discourse every time a legitimacy challenge related to the corporate in-
volvement with sustainable development arises, given that this would consume a lot of time 
and resources. Second, this solution presupposes certain elements of the other two solutions: 
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in particular, critical discourse is only possible if there are individuals capable of critical 
thinking and discussion. These abilities can be encouraged through the creation of a stimulat-
ing organizational context, supportive leadership, and appropriate HR policies, such as the 
selection of open-minded people, personal training in situations of ambiguity and conflict, and 
incentive systems that endorse reflective critique (see e.g. Kang and Snell, 2009). Similarly, 
the selected legitimacy strategies might require specific groups or units that are capable of 
implementing them. These might include marketing and PR departments whose staff have the 
necessary skills in strategic manipulation, specialized teams that can provide a platform for an 
open discourse with stakeholders, or teams that are able to manage the process of change in 
the case of isomorphic adaptations. 
As indicated earlier, the capacity of an organization to accommodate all legitimacy 
strategies seems to rest on a combination of the three different solutions: the capacity for in-
ternal reflection means that the different legitimacy challenges of unsustainable business 
practices can be considered on different levels of the organization and the selected strategies 
in response to those challenges can be better coordinated. The contextual solutions approach 
helps individual members acquire at least a basic ability to select between different legitimacy 
strategies in direct contact with local stakeholders and their concerns about sustainability is-
sues. This can also help reduce the number of internal reflection platforms that these proc-
esses require and encourage individuals to develop the critical ability that is necessary for 
conducting reflective discussions. Finally, the structural solutions approach can help the or-
ganization develop the ability to employ its chosen legitimacy strategies in an effective and 
efficient way. Seen from this perspective, the corporation will be able to develop a both/and 
logic in order to respond to the challenges of paradox and to manage the legitimacy expecta-
tions with regards to sustainable business practices. 
5. Conclusions and Contributions 
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We started this paper with the observation that the debates on sustainable development and on 
corporate legitimacy have become strongly entangled, in the sense that corporations that do 
not conform to expectations about sustainability will see their legitimacy challenged. Drawing 
on the existing literature, we have argued that the opportunity to tackle perceived legitimacy 
challenges is what mainly motivates corporations to adopt sustainable practices and engage in 
debates on SD issues. The traditional approach to such challenges entails either adapting iso-
morphically to the expectations of the external stakeholders or strategically manipulating 
those expectations without altering the corporation’s existing structures and practices. How-
ever, we argued that it is no longer sufficient for MNCs to rely on these two legitimacy strate-
gies due to the growing complexity and heterogeneity of today’s social environment (Child 
and Rodrigues, 2011; Jones and Fleming, 2003; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Scherer and Pa-
lazzo, 2011; Smith and Lewis, 2011). Instead, corporations are increasingly acknowledging 
the necessity of moral reasoning as an alternative legitimacy strategy (Palazzo and Scherer, 
2006) and also the need to develop the capacity to activate all three legitimacy strategies si-
multaneously, if necessary. We showed that both the ‘one best way’ approach (e.g. Ulrich, 
2000) and the contingency approach (e.g. Child and Rodrigues, 2011) with their focus on a 
single legitimacy strategy (in general or for each situation) are problematic as corporations 
navigate in an increasingly fragmented and dynamic global environment facing multiple, het-
erogeneous and conflicting SD-related challenges. In such contexts, the successful mainte-
nance and repair of legitimacy tends to require a much more sophisticated approach that calls 
for a capacity to combine all three strategies in order to address the various legitimacy issues 
related to the corporation’s contribution to SD. Drawing on the burgeoning paradox literature 
(Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008; Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010; Smith and Lewis, 2011), we 
described how corporations can develop such a capacity by combining structural and contex-
tual arrangements with internal platforms for reflection. We argue that corporations that pos-
sess this capacity are more successful in preserving their legitimacy in face of multiple, het-
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erogeneous and conflicting SD-related challenges than those that do not. In our paper we thus 
evaluate the appropriateness of the different legitimacy strategies, with regards to particular 
issues in particular situations, from a corporate perspective. Our concept can also be used with 
a different epistemological lens. Those strategies (and their combinations) can be examined as 
appropriate or inappropriate from a normative point of view as well. However, such a norma-
tive-ethical analysis of the application of alternative legitimacy strategies is beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
Overall, this paper makes contributions to two streams of literature. First, it contrib-
utes to the burgeoning SD literature by providing a systematic analysis of SD-related issues 
from the perspective of corporate legitimacy. While other authors have already pointed to the 
fruitfulness of the institutional perspective for studying how corporations deal with SD-
related issues (Bansal, 2005; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Jennings and Zandbergen, 
1995; Schaefer, 2007), this is the first paper to provide a systematic analysis of the different 
legitimacy strategies that are connected to SD. Thus, we contribute to this literature by pro-
viding an integrated framework of the different legitimacy strategies and the ways in which 
they are employed. Beyond that, we make a further contribution to the SD debate by elaborat-
ing on the challenges resulting particularly from operations in increasingly fragmented and 
dynamically globalized environments, which require a ‘paradox approach’ for managing SD-
related legitimacy concerns. As Marcus and Fremeth (2009) have argued, SD will be a key 
challenge for companies and managers not because it offers an additional potential to make 
profits but because it becomes a taken for granted assumption of western societies that corpo-
rations invest in green management. Put differently, it becomes a key dimension of legiti-
macy. This does create tensions within corporations and between corporations and their re-
spective societal contexts in global business. Research has to explore how these tensions can 
be managed, which competencies have to be built up, and how SD, as a public good, can be 
aligned with business objectives (Marcus and Fremeth, 2009). Our paper analyzes these ten-
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sions and develops insights into the organizational implications of managing legitimacy and 
the corporate engagement with SD. Second, we contribute to the institutional literature, which 
lately has called for more research on organizational responses to institutional complexity 
(Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Kraatz and Block, 2008; Lamin and Zaheer, 2012). Greenwood 
and colleagues (2011, p. 351), in particular, note that the ‘sustainability of organizational re-
sponses and their alteration and variability across time is a neglected but important theme that 
deserves serious attention’. Pache and Santos (2010, p. 473) have already shown that organi-
zations that are ‘particularly competent in mobilizing [different response] strategies are likely 
to be in a better position to survive and thrive in the mist of conflicting institutional demands’. 
However, they did not explore this issue further and underestimate the dynamics of environ-
mental challenges, regarding conflict and heterogeneity among institutional demands as an 
exception rather than the rule in the globalized world (see the limitations in Pache and Santos, 
2010, p. 472).  
In our paper, we show that the integration of concepts from the paradox literature can 
help explain how organizations are able to respond to contradictory legitimacy demands by 
employing conflicting strategies in parallel, which implies a ‘both/and perspective’ instead of 
an ‘either/or choice’ (Smith and Lewis, 2011, p. 387). In this way we have opened up new 
avenues for institutional research. In particular, further research might now examine empiri-
cally whether organizations in heterogeneous and dynamic environments that have chosen a 
paradox approach are indeed more successful in preserving their overall legitimacy than those 
that have chosen other approaches. In addition to that further research might look into the 
different ways in which the paradox approach to managing legitimacy challenges is accom-
plished by different organizations, explore how organizations maintain their identity despite 
the heterogeneity of legitimacy strategies, and analyse how this affects the overall success of 
their responses. 
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